The vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to adversarial attacks has led to development of many defense approaches. Among them, Adversarial Training (AT) is a popular and widely used approach for training adversarially robust models. Mixup Training (MT), a recent popular training algorithm, improves generalization performance of models by introducing globally linear behavior in between training examples. Although still in its early phase, we observe a shift in trend of exploiting Mixup from perspectives of generalisation to that of adversarial robustness. It has been shown that the Mixup trained models improves robustness of models but only passively. A recent approach, Mixup Inference (MI), proposes an inference principle for Mixup trained models to counter adversarial examples at inference time by mixing the input with other random clean samples. In this work, we propose a new approach -VarMixup (Variational Mixup) -to better sample mixup images by using the latent manifold underlying the data. Our experiments on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, SVHN and Tiny-Imagenet demonstrate that VarMixup beats state-of-the-art AT techniques without training the model adversarially. Additionally, we also conduct ablations that show that models trained on VarMixup samples are also robust to various input corruptions/perturbations, have low calibration error and are transferable.
Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have become a key ingredient to solve many challenging tasks like classification, segmentation, object detection, speech recognition, etc. However, it is now known that they can be fooled by applying imperceptible perturbations, called adversarial perturbations, to input examples leading to wrong predictions [41, 14] . Over the past few years, various approaches [47, 21, 1, 8, 27, 14, 49, 30, 29] have been proposed to craft adversarial examples by maximizing the network's prediction error in distinct ways. As a consequence, it has become quite risky to deploy them in safety-critical applications including autonomous navigation or healthcare. Efforts [27, 14, 36, 38, 55, 35, 31, 12, 44] have been made in recent years to make models robust to these adversarial perturbations. Among the proposed methods, Adversarial Training (AT) [38, 27, 14, 56, 25] arXiv:2003.06566v1 [cs. LG] 14 Mar 2020 has emerged as a popular and widely uses algorithm to obtain adversarially robust models. Several variants of adversarial training have been proposed lately with motivation of inducing local linearity [35] by training networks using adversarial examples. However, training robust models using AT is not only computationally expensive but suffers from a performance degradation on clean examples [43] . Though some recent attempts [37, 53] have managed to adversarially train models in a low computational budget, they still suffer from the trade-off between standard accuracy and robustness to adversarial perturbations.
On the other hand, Mixup Training (MT) [57] has emerged as a popular technique to train models having both better generalisation and robustness. However, robustness performance of Mixup trained models is significantly lower than AT techniques [25, 27] when it comes to strong adversarial attacks like PGD [27] , structural [49] or functional attacks. Taking advantage of the induced global linearity in between training examples by MT, Pang et al. [33] proposed Mixup Inference (MI) to exploit this global linearity at inference time and better defend Mixup-trained models against adversarial attacks. Though MI has been shown to significantly boost adversarial robustness of Mixup-trained models, the performance outperforms AT only when applied on top of Interpolated Adversarial Training [25] , which is yet another adversarial training technique.
Although still in its early phase, the above efforts [57, 46, 33] indicate a trend to viewing Mixup from a robustness perspective. Fig. 1 : Performance of Mixup Training (MT) [57] , Mixup-Inference (MI) [33] , Adversarial training (AT) [27] , TRADES [56] , LAT [38] , IAT [25] and VarMixup (ours)
In this work, we take another step in this direction and propose a sampling technique called VarMixup (Variational Mixup) to sample better Mixup images during training and inference to induce adversarial robustness. In particular, we hypothesize that the latent unfolded manifold underlying the data (through a generative model, a Varaitional Autoencoder in our case) is linear by construction, and hence more suitable for the linear interpolations used in Mixup. Importantly, we show that this choice of the distribution for Mixup plays an important role towards adversarial robustness (Section 3). Our experiments on 4 standard datasets-CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, SVHN, Tiny-Imagenet shows that VarMixup when combined with Mixup training and inference, beats state-of the art adversarial training techniques (like PGD [27] and IAT [25] ) under oblivious attacks without training model adversarially.
We conduct several other studies to examine the proposed method, and obtain promising results across all these experiments. Our contributions can be summarized as follows: -We propose a new sampling technique, VarMixup, which when combined with Mixup training and inference, outperforms adversarial training (by 5-10%) techniques without training the model in adversarial fashion. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first sampling technique explicitly proposed for adversarial robustness, and also the first among Mixup methods to consider the latent unfolded manifold for interpolation. -Additionally, we show that models trained using VarMixup samples are robust to common corruptions and perturbations, have low calibration error and are transferable. -We also conduct a comprehensive set of studies which show that VarMixup significantly decreases the local linearity error of the neural network and generates samples that are slightly off-distribution from training examples or mixup generated samples, to provide robustness.
Related Work
We briefly discuss earlier efforts in adversarial attacks and defenses, as well as Mixup-based methods, that are closest to this work. Adversarial Attacks and Defenses Adversarial Attacks can be mainly classified into three categories: White-box attacks [30, 27, 47, 14] , Black-box attacks [21, 1, 34, 8] and Oblivious attacks [9] . In the white-box setting, the adversary has full access to the network; and in the black-box setting, the adversary has no information about the network. Oblivious adversaries are not aware of the existence of the defense mechanism, and generate adversarial examples based on the unsecured classification model. With this advancement in adversarial attacks every year, various defenses have been proposed to counter them. Parseval networks [12] and Liplitchz Margin Training [44] train robust models by reducing their Lipschitz constant. LAT [38] , Feature denoising [48] , and Feature Scattering [55] achieve robustness by harnessing the fact that latent layers can help defend to perturbations. TRADES [56] presents a new defense method that provides a trade-off between adversarial robustness and accuracy by decomposing the prediction error for adversarial examples (robust error) as the sum of the natural (classification) error and boundary error. Among the proposed approaches, Adversarial Training (AT) [27, 14, 25, 28] is a popular and widely opted strategy. The objective of AT is to train models on adversarial examples at every step of training to better match the adversarial distribution encountered at test time. Qin et al. [35] show that AT techniques make the loss landscapes of networks locally linear, and propose a regularizer that encourages the loss to behave linearly in the vicinity of the training data. A similar work [31] acts as a network regularizer by directly minimizing curvature of their loss surface, leading to adversarial robustness that is on par with adversarial training. Though AT is an effective way of improving the robustness of deep networks, they are usually computationally expensive. To address this drawback of AT, recent approaches [37, 54] aim to reduce adversarial training overhead by recycling gradients and accelerating via the maximal principle respectively. For a comprehensive review of the work done in the area of adversarial examples, please refer [51] .
Mixup:
Mixup [57] is a recent method that trains networks on convex combinations of data pairs and their labels. By doing so, it regularizes the network to behave linearly in between training examples, thus inducing global linearity between them. A recent variant, Manifold Mixup [46] , exploits interpolations at hidden representations, thereby obtaining neural networks with smoother decision boundaries at different levels of hidden representations. AugMix [19] mixes up multiple augmented images and uses a Jensen-Shannon Divergence consistency loss on them to achieve better robustness to common input corruptions [18] . In semi-supervised learning, MixMatch [4] obtains state-of-the-art results by guessing low-entropy labels for data-augmented unlabeled examples and mixes labeled and unlabeled data using Mixup. It has been shown that apart from better generalization, Mixup also improves the robustness of models to adversarial perturbations but not as significantly as AT. To further boost this robustness at inference time, Pang et al. [33] recently proposed a Mixup Inference technique which performs a mixup of input x with a clean sample x s and passes the corresponding mixup sample (λ·x+(1−λ)·x s ) into the classifier as the processed input. Their analysis indicates that MI imposes a tighter upper bound on the potential attack ability for a crafted perturbation leading to robustness to adversarial attacks. Other efforts on Mixup [42] have shown that Mixup-trained networks are significantly better calibrated than ones trained in the regular fashion. These recent efforts have shown the potential of Mixup-based methods, which we exploit in the latent space for state-of-the-art robustness results.
Comparison with Other Mixup-related Work:
Considering the recent popularity of Mixup-based methods, we address how our work is different from other recent efforts in Mixup. Xu et al. [50] use domain mixup to improve the generalization ability of models in domain adaptation. Adversarial Mixup Resynthesis [3] involves mixing latent codes used by autoencoders through an arbitrary mixing mechanism that can recombine codes from different inputs to produce novel examples. This work however has a different objective and focuses on generative models in a GAN-like setting, while our work focuses on adversarial robustness, which is a different objective. The work by Liu et al. [26] might be closest to ours in terms of approach as they introduce the adversarial autoencoder (AAE) to impose the feature representations with uniform distribution and apply the linear interpolation on latent space. However, their work deals from a generalization perspective, and results show marginal improvements. In our work, we directly exploit the manifold learned by VAE (and do not regularize it unlike the previous work) for the mixup and report improved adversarial robustness. Moreover, we also present useful insights into the working of VarMixup (leading to robustness), which is lacking in earlier work including [26] , thus making our contributions different and more complete.
Methodology

Notations and Preliminaries
We denote a neural network as F w : R c×h×w → R k , with weight parameters w. F w takes an image x ∈ R c×h×w and outputs logits, F i w (x) for each class i ∈ {1...k}. Without loss of generality, we assume the classification task, and L denotes the standard cross-entropy loss function. p actual denotes the training data distribution, and the optimal weight parameter, w * , obtained by training the network using standard empirical risk minimization is given by:
Here y is the true label associated with input x. We now briefly introduce the concepts relevant to this work, before describing our methodology. Adversarial Attacks: In this work, we consider L ∞ bounded Projected Gradient Descent Attack (PGD) [27] which is a more powerful, multi-step variant of F GSM [14] attack, and commonly considered among the state-of-the-art adversarial attacks. The adversary of input x is computed as follows:
where α is the step size, Π is the projection function, and S is the space of possible perturbations. For more details, we refer the interested reader to [27] .
Adversarial Training (AT): This is used to train the model in a robust manner by continuously augmenting the data with adversarial perturbations, to match the training distribution with the adversarial test distribution [14, 27] . Essentially, for AT, the optimal parameter w * is given by:
Here, the inner maximization max δ∈N L (F w (x + δ), y) is calculated using a strong adversarial attack such as PGD.
Mixup: [57] proposed a method to train models on the convex combination of pairs of examples and their labels. In other words, it constructs virtual training examples as: Mixup Inference: [33] , a recently developed specialized inference principle for mixup-trained models, attempts to break the locality of adversarial perturbations. Assuming that F w is a pre-trained mixup model, the output scores using MI, F M I w (x), on an input x is given by:
Here, λ M I ∈ [0, 1] is a fixed mixup coefficient and p M I is known as a sampling pool which differs for different variants of MI. In this work, we consider MI-OL (MI with other labels), where the sampling pool p M I contains examples uniformly belonging to all classes except the predicted class of x. The expectation can be approximated by averaging over N M I runs.
Background: Vicinal Risk Minimization
Given the data distribution p actual , a neural network F w and loss function L, the expected risk (average of loss function over p actual ) is given by R(F w ) = L(F w (x), y)·dp actual (x, y). In practice, the true distribution p actual is unknown, and is approximated by the training dataset
Using p δ as an estimate to p actual , we define expected empirical risk as:
Minimizing Eqn 4 to find optimal F w * is typically termed Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM). However overparametrized neural networks can suffer from memorizing, leading to undesirable behavior of network outside the training distribution, p δ . Addressing this concern, Chapelle et al. proposed Vicinal Risk Minimization (VRM), where p actual is approximated by a vicinal distribution p v , given by:
where v is the vicinal distribution that calculates the probability of a data point (x, y) in the vicinity of other samples (x i , y i ). Thus, using p v to approximate p actual , expected vicinal risk is given by:
where
, which is equivalent to augmenting the training samples with Gaussian noise; and (ii) Mixup Vicinal distribution :
From a perspective of adversarial robustness, analogous to previous definitions, we define adversarial risk in this work as:
where S is the space of allowed perturbations. Let F v w * be the solution of minimization of vicinal adversarial risk, R adv v (F w ). Then, following (cf. Eqn 11 in) [52] , the quantity
corresponds to the estimation of the expected adversarial risk of F v w * from its vicinal adversarial risk, and this can be bounded as:
which we call the robustness bound for VRM. Note again that this bound is analogous to the generalization bound for VRM in [52] . Motivated by this bound, we propose an approach to leverage the vicinal distribution to achieve adversarial robustness. From Eqn 8, we observe that the bound depends on two factors: (1) the choice of vicinal distribution v and (2) the choice of family neural networks F w . In this work, we limit the choice of F w to ResNets [17] (specifically ResNet-34), thereby restricting the function class, and study the choice of vicinal distribution. Considering the recent success of using Mixup as a vicinal distribution for generalization [57] and Mixup inference for state-of-the-art adversarial robustness [33] , we choose to consider a vicinal distribution based on Mixupbased linear interpolations. However, we propose the use of vicinal distributions from latent spaces in this work. We explain this choice below. The use of generative models such as Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) [23] to capture the latent space from which a distribution is generated provides us an unfolded manifold (the low-dimensional latent space), where the linearity in between training examples is more readily observed. Defining vicinal distributions by using neighbours on this latent manifold (which is linear in the low-dimensional space) learned by generative models hence provides us more effective linear interpolations than the ones in input space. We use a generative model to capture the induced global linearity in between examples on a latent manifold, and define mixup vicinal distributions on this latent surface.
Our Approach: VarMixup (Variational Mixup)
To capture the latent manifold of the training data through a generative model, we opt for a Variational Autoencoder (VAE). VAE [23] is an autoencoder which is trained using Variational Inference, which serves as an implicit regularizer to ensure that the obtained latent space allows us to generate new data from the same distribution as training data.
We denote the encoding and decoding distribution of VAE as q φ (z|x) and p θ (x|z) respectively, parameterized by φ and θ respectively. Given p(z) as the desired prior distribution for encoding, the general VAE objective is given by the loss function:
Here, D is any strict divergence, meaning that D(q p) ≥ 0 and D(q p) = 0 if and only if q = p, and γ > 0 is a scaling coefficient. The second term in the objective act as a image resconstruction loss and
The original VAE [23] uses KL-divergence in Eqn 9, and thus optimizes the objective:
where p is p actual . However, using KL-divergence in Eqn 9 has some shortcomings. As pointed out by [10, 39, 58] , the KL-divergence in Eqn 10 can be restrictive [11, 40, 6] as it encourages the encoding q φ (z|x) to be a random sample from p(z) for each x, making them uninformative about the input. Also, it is not strong enough a regularizer compared to the reconstruction loss and tends to overfit data, consequently, learning a q φ (z|x) that has high variance. Both the aforementioned shortcomings can affect the encoding distribution by making them uninformative of inputs with high variance. Since we use VAEs to better capture a linear latent manifold and subsequently define interpolations there, a bad latent distribution can affect our method significantly. We hence use a variant Maximum Mean Discrepancy VAE (MMD-VAE) [58] which uses a MMD Loss [15] instead of KL-divergence, and hence optimizes the objective:
A MMD-VAE doesn't suffer from the aforementioned shortcomings [58] , as it maximizes mutual information between x and z by matching the distribution over encodings q φ (z) with prior p(z) only in expectation, rather than for every input. We hence train an MMD-VAE to characterize the training distribution more effectively. We now define a Mixup vicinal distribution in the latent space of the trained VAE as:
where λ ∼ β(η, η) and η > 0. Using the above vicinal distribution, v V arM ixup and the MMD-VAE decoder, p θ (x|z), we construct VarMixup samples as:
From another perspective, one could view our new sampling technique as performing Manifold Mixup [46] , however over the latent space of an MMD-VAE (instead of the neural network feature space) and using it for sample reconstruction. (We compare against Manifold Mixup in our results.) Figure 2 illustrates the conceptual idea behind VarMixup. Analogous to the empirical distribution, p δ used in Eqn 4, we also define a (non-vicinal) Empirical Risk Minimization, defined using the VAE, which we call VarERM, and is given by:
and use the MMD-VAE decoder, p θ (x|z) to construct samples which are close to the original distribution. We use this for comparisons in our experiments. Additionally, it is easy to observe that our VarMixup sampling can also be integrated with Mixup-Inference which is given by: 
Experiments and Results
We now present our experimental studies and results using our method, VarMixup, on multiple datasets. We begin by describing the datasets, evaluation criteria and implementation details.
Datasets:
We perform experiments on four well-known standard datasets: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 [24] , SVHN [32] and Tiny-ImageNet [13] . Descriptions of these standard datasets are deferred to the Supplementary section. CIFAR-10 is a subset of 80 million tiny images dataset and consists of 60,000 32 × 32 color images containing one of 10 object classes, with 6000 images per class. CIFAR-100 is just like CIFAR-10, except that it has 100 classes containing 600 images each. There are 500 training images and 100 testing images per class. SVHN is obtained from house numbers in Google Street View images. It consists of 32 × 32 color images belonging to 10 classes with 73257 digits for training and 26032 digits for testing. Tiny-Imagenet has 200 classes, with each class containing 500 training images, 50 validation images, and 50 test images. Each image here is of resolution 64 × 64. Evaluation Criteria: Analogous to Mixup Inference [33] , we evaluate trained models under the oblivious setting [9] where the adversary is not aware of the existence of the defense mechanism (e.g. MI, VarMI), and generates adversarial examples based on the classification model. We follow recent papers [33, 38, 25, 31] and use a 10-step untargeted PGD [27] attack with step-size α = 8 255 and l ∞ perturbation = 8 255 across all datasets. We also report accuracy on clean images and standard deviations over 10 trials. We evaluate the robustness of our trained models on the newer CIFAR-10-C, CIFAR-100-C and Tiny-Imagenet-C datasets [18] too. These datasets contain images, corrupted with 15 different distortions at 5 severity levels. Additionaly, We also perform evaluation under white-box adaptive setting [2] analogous to Mixup-Inference. In section 5, we also evaluate our models on targeted, stronger PGD and gradient-free attacks to confirm the absence of gradient masking or obfuscation [7, 2] . Implementation Details: It has been shown [22] that training a network adversarially removes irrelevant biases (e.g. texture biases) in their hidden representations, thus making them more informative. We hence hypothesize that the considered VAE, if trained adversarially, will have more informative latent encoding than its regular equivalent. This would hence help improve the empirical/vicinal distributions like VarMixup, VarERM and VarMI. Empirically, we validate this hypothesis in our subsequent experiments and use prefix adv-(eg: adv -VarMixup) to distinguish them from their regular variants. We stress that the aforementioned approach should not be confused with training a model adversarially using VarMixup (we only train the VAE adversarially). We also train a model adversarially using VarMixup, but discuss these results in the Supplementary section to avoid overcrowding of results and space constraints. Table 1 summarizes the variants of our approach that we consider with their corresponding abbreviations, which we used in subsequent sections. All models are trained on Resnet-34 [17] backbone across all datasets. A study on varying hyper-parameters is presented in Section 5. [38] , Local-Linear Regularization [35] and Curvature regularization [31] reported from original papers. Robustness on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, SVHN and Tiny-Imagenet: We first evaluate the robustness and report our results in Table 2 . As can be seen, without any adversarial training VarMixup + VarMI outperforms state-of-theart adversarial training techniques by a significant margin (∼ 5% over IAT + MI and ∼ 10 − 12% over other AT techniques). Also, it can be noticed that the adversarial variant of our approach -adv -VarMixup + adv -VarMI performs better across all datasets. Transferability from Tiny-Imagenet to CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100: The proposed methodology will be more scalable and time-efficient, if a VAE trained on a dataset such as ImageNet can be used to generate VarMixup samples for other datasets. This is a typical transfer learning setting, and we study the performance of training VarMixup models on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets using MMD-VAE trained on the Tiny-Imagenet dataset. We report our findings in Table 3 . It can be seen that our approaches -VarMixup + VarMI/ adv-VarMixup + adv-VarMI still manage to outperform all adversarial training baselines (which are trained directly on the target dataset) by a good margin (∼ 1 − 2% over IAT+MI and ∼ 10 − 15% over other AT techniques). Robustness to common input corruptions: Apart from adversarial perturbations, we also evaluate the trained models on various common input corruptions. Hendrycks et al. [18] recently proposed newer CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and Tiny-Imagenet test datasets (CIFAR-10-C, CIFAR-100-C, and Tiny-Imagenet-C) containing images corrupted with 15 different distortions (Gaussian blur, Shot Noise, Impulse Noise, JPEG compression, Motion blur, frost, etc.) and 5 levels of severity. We report the mean classification accuracy over all distortions on CIFAR-10-C, CIFAR-100-C and Tiny-Imagenet-C datasets in Table 4 . From the table, our method -VarMixup/adv -VarMixup achieves superior performance by a margin of ∼ 2 − 4%. It is also interesting to note that other variants like VarERM/adv -VarERM also perform significantly better than vanilla ERM and many adversarial training techniques, highlighting our method's effectiveness. Comparison with Manifold Mixup: As stated in Section 3, one could view our method as performing Manifold Mixup in a latent space. It has been stated [46] that models trained using Manifold Mixup are not robust to strong adversarial attacks like PGD [27] . However, for completeness and fairness, we study the performance of the two approaches. We obtain 2.24% and 9.48% accuracy against a 10-step PGD attack (used in Table 2 ) using Manifold-Mixup and Manifold-Mixup + MI on the CIFAR-10 dataset. For CIFAR-100, the corresponding accuracies are 1.87% and 5.94% on Manifold-Mixup and Manifold-Mixup + MI respectively. For SVHN, Manifold mixup achieves adversarial accuracy 26.5% and 11.55% with and without MI. For Tiny Imagenet, the accuracies are 2.99% and 0.07% for Manifold Mixup with and without MI respectively. As can be compared from Table 2 , VarMixup + MI performs superior to Manifold Mixup. We defer analogous results on SVHN and Tiny-Imagenet datasets to the Supplementary material due to space constraints. Our results show that the use of the latent unfolded manifold is indeed better than using hidden layer representations. Performance under White-box Adaptive Attacks: Following Athalye et al. [2] and analogous to Mixup-Inference [33] , we design adaptive white-box attacks for VarMI. From Eqn 14, VarMI is given as:
Then, the gradient of VarMI prediction w.r.t. input x is given as (here, λ M I is fixed throughout inference):
Now, according to Eqn 15 above, the sign of gradients used in adaptive PGD can be approximated by:
Here, the number of adaptive samples, N A , refers to the execution times of sampling x s in each iteration step of adaptive PGD to approximate the above equation. Figure 3 shows the performance of Mixup/VarMixup/adv -VarMixup under adaptive PGD attacks on CIFAR-10/-100. As can be seen, our proposed inference VarMI along with VarMixup performs better than regular Mixup and Mixup-Inference. 
Discussion and Ablation studies
In this section, we conduct ablations to empirically characterize and analyze the efficacy of the proposed method.
Local linearity on loss landscapes:
It has been shown [35] that local linearity of loss landscapes of neural networks is related to model robustness. The more the loss landscapes are linear, the more the adversarial robustness. To this fact, we analyze the local linearity of loss landscapes of VarMixup and regular mixup trained models. Qin et al. [35] defines local linearity at a data-point x within a neighbourhood B( ) as: Figure 4 shows the average local linear error (over test set) with increasing L ∞ max-perturbation on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets. As can be seen, VarMixup/adv -VarMixup makes the local linear error significantly (× 2) lesser as compared to regular mixup, thus inducing robustness. This robustness gets further boosted by using VarMI at inference stage. Figure 7 shows sample data generated by regular Mixup, VarMixup, and adv -VarMixup on two images. We observe that though mixup or VarMixup samples look perceptually similar, they are quite different at statistical level. We measure the Frechet Inception Distance (FID) [20] and Kernel Inception Distance [5] between regular training data and training data generated by mixup/VarMixup/ adv -VarMixup. These scores summarize how similar the two groups are in terms of statistics on computer vision features of the raw images calculated using the Inceptionv3 model used for image classification. Lower scores indicate the two groups of images are more similar, or have more similar statistics, with a perfect score being 0.0 indicating that the two groups of images are identical. Figure  5 reports these metrics on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively. The greater FID and KID scores indicate that we are adding off-manifold samples (manifold characterized by training data) to the training using our approach. Calibration error: A recent study [42] showed that DNNs trained with Mixup are significantly better calibrated than DNNs trained in a regular fashion. Calibration [16] measures how good softmax scores are as indicators of the actual likelihood of a correct prediction. We measure the Expected Calibration Error(ECE) [42, 16] of our trained networks, following [42] : predictions (total N predictions) are grouped into M interval bins (B m ) of equal size. The accuracy and confidence of B m are defined as:
wherep i ,ŷ i , y i are the confidence, predicted label and true label of sample i respectively. The Expected Calibration Error(ECE) is then defined as: Table 2 (main submission), under oblivious settings, VarIAT (VarIAT + VarMI) achieves superior performance to IAT (IAT + MI) in most scenarios. The evaluations were carried out in the same setting as Table  2 . Robustness to stronger, targeted and gradient-free attacks: we also evaluate our models on a stronger 50-step PGD attack [27] (PGD 50 ), targeted 10-step PGD attacks (t-PGD 10 ) and Gradient free SPSA [45] attack. We use = 8/255 for all attacks. For targeted attacks, we chose the second most likely class as target class. SPSA results are evaluated over 1000 test samples. We report our results in Table 5 . As can be seen, our methods VarMixup + VarMI outperforms the rest in most scenarios. The results also confirm the absence of any gradient masking and obfuscation [7, 2] in our training method. Hyperparameter variations: We vary the beta distribution β(η, η) (used to sample Mixup coefficient) parameter -η and train models using mixup, VarMixup and adv -VarMixup and plot their adversarial accuracies in Figure  6 . Figure 6 shows the variation of adversarial accuracy when λ M I is varied from 0 to 1 in MI or VarMI. Both figures show that our VarMixup trained models perform better irrespective of hyperparameters in most cases. In this work, we propose a Mixup vicinal distribution, VarMixup, which performs linear interpolations on an unfolded latent manifold where linearity in between training examples is likely to be preserved by construction. Analogous to Mixup Inference, we also define Variational Mixup Inference (VarMI) which when combined with VarMixup trained models provides significant gains in adversarial robustness over regular Mixup, Mixup Inference, and state-of-the-art adversarial training techniques under oblivious attacks. We also show that VarMixup trained models are more robust to common input corruptions, are better calibrated and have significantly lower locallinear loss than regular mixup models. Additionally, our experiments indicate that VarMixup adds more off-manifold images to training than regular mixup, which we believe is the primary reason for observed robustness. Our work highlights the efficacy of defining vicinal distributions by using neighbors on unfolded latent manifold rather than data manifold and we believe that our work can open a discussion around this notion of robustness and choice of vicinal distributions.
